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Introduction
After the summer of increased flare-ups and casualties from the 
war in Ukraine, the month of September has witnessed fresh dis-
cussions about the revival of the Minsk II agreement.1  The French 
and German foreign ministers recently visited Ukraine, including 
its eastern conflict-ridden regions, ‘to shore up a 2015 peace deal 
that has foundered amid continuing fighting in eastern Ukraine’ 
(PressTV, 2016). Despite the increased attention to the Minsk II 
agreement, there is still a gap in the different interpretations of 
the agreement and its implementation.2 
The interpretation of Minsk II is important, particularly within 
the EU Member States which hold sway over the decision as to 
whether to continue sanctions against Russia. This Policy Brief 
analyses the narratives presented in the web-based news articles 
that are published by outlets supported by the Russian govern-
ment – i.e. Russia Today Deutsch, Russia Today en Francais 
and Sputnik News DE, Sputnik France. The analysis compares 
these narratives to national ones in France and Germany (e.g. Le 
Monde, Libération, Le Figaro, Bildt, Die Welt, Die Zeit, Deutsche 
Welle, FAZ). In total, seventy-five articles were analysed on the 
topic featuring the ‘Minsk II agreement’, ‘Russia’ and/or ‘Ukraine’. 
The timespan of the analysis focuses on late December 2015 and 
January, February and early March 2016, since the discussion 
was particularly acute in light of the one-year anniversary of the 
Minsk II agreement. The Policy Brief further triangulates this data 
with the literature on German and French relations with Russia 
and Ukraine. The research focuses on Germany and France in the 
light of their position as leading EU Member States who are part 
of the ‘Normandy Group’ involved in mediating between Ukraine 
and Russia. 
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An analysis of the main narratives on Ukraine and Minsk II 
agreement featured in mainstream French and German media 
suggests that Russia’s influence to affect public discourse in 
these two powerful member states is rather limited. The French 
and German governments continue to support the current 
sanctions regime and their public opinions are broadly support-
ive of that policy. However, there has been a concerted effort 
by the Russian government to promote its narratives through 
(1) Russia-owned news outlets (such as Russia Today, Sput-
nik); (2) interviews and quotes of Russian officials appearing 
in the national news; (3) supporting those French and German 
This Policy Brief is the second in a two-part fea-
ture that examines Russia’s ability to influence 
French and German narratives on the Minsk II 
agreement and Ukraine’s evolving position in 
the international system. While the first Policy 
Brief analysed the gap between Ukrainian-Rus-
sian interpretations of the Minsk II agreement, 
this Brief traces how these narratives are con-
textualised in French and German media land-
scapes. The research concludes that while 
there is a consistent presence of Russian nar-
ratives in public discourse in these countries, 
they had limited impact on their public opin-
ion. The German/French news coverage of the 
Minsk II agreement as well as the role of Russia 
and Ukraine in its implementation differs from 
Russian-sponsored news. The Brief analyzes the 
wider diplomatic relations between Germany, 
France and Russia, particularly focusing on the 
deteriorating relations before the Ukraine crisis.
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2‘indigenous’ narratives that already feature Russia-friendly 
narratives and themes about the Minsk process or Ukraine. 
The discourses, however, are not limited to these topics but 
focus on wider topics that amplify signs of discontent with the 
European integration project, refugee policies and anti-terror-
ist efforts. Such narratives resonate with far-right and far-left 
groups that increasingly tap into support from the mainstream 
voters.
Media Narratives
What are the main narratives in the 
Russian-sponsored news?
When analysing narratives concerning Ukraine and the Minsk 
II agreement there are several arguments that consistently ap-
pear in both French and German versions of Russia Today and 
Sputnik. These narratives are also fed by Russian government 
officials that are interviewed by the Western press. 
One such dominant narrative is that Russia is not a party to 
Minsk II. Ukraine is to blame for the lack of progress in the 
implementation of the agreement. As President Putin said in 
his interview directed to the German audience: ‘anything that 
is missing in the implementation of the Minsk agreement is 
[…] up to the Kiev central government of Ukraine…’ (Bild, 2016, 
also see RT DE 2015). In his view, the most important aspect 
[of Minsk] is constitutional reform under Point 11 of the agree-
ment (ibid.). This position is echoed in the French Russia Be-
yond Headlines (RBTH) which further argues that the ‘resump-
tion of hostilities might benefit Kiev’ since intensified conflict 
can distract Ukrainians from their difficult economic situation 
and provide a basis for continued sanctions (RBTH, 2015, also 
see RT DE, 2016m). 
Russia – depicted as being sincerely interested in realising 
Mink II because it wishes to cease conflict with the West (the 
EU and the US) – hopes that the West, in turn, will exercise 
greater pressure on Kyiv on the status of Donbas (Ibid., RBTH, 
2016a). Russian media particularly cites the arguments of the 
German and French foreign ministers that Ukraine needs to do 
more to implement Minsk II (Sputnik DE, 2016g; Sputnik DE, 
2016i; RT DE, 2016m). 
The Ukrainian government is portrayed as ‘illegitimate’ and 
lacking popular support (RT, 2016e, 2016g). The financing pro-
vided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is described as 
the only lifeline that barely sustains the life of the ‘extremely 
fragile’ and ‘corrupt’ Kyiv government, according to the Ger-
man and French RT and Sputnik. Other articles further state 
that the IMF threatens to stop financing Ukraine if it does not 
implement reforms (RT, 2016j) and that without the IMF’s sup-
port Ukraine would fail (RT, 2016k). According to Russia Today, 
the Ukrainian government may eventually disintegrate (RT, 
2016h) as there is a vicious circle between ‘revolution-decep-
tion-stagnation’ (Sputnik France, 2016c). 
Overall, the Ukrainian government is depicted as a ‘puppet’ of 
the West – especially the US – and the oligarchs (RT, 2016f). 
The Russian media at times quote Western media when these 
themes resonate. For instance, Sputnik mentioned that the ‘Fi-
nancial Times says efforts of Ukraine are in vain’ (ibid.). The 
narrative of the Ukrainian government being ‘illegitimate’ is 
accompanied with a portrait of Russian actions in Crimea as 
legitimate. For instance, in the interview with a German popu-
lar newspaper, Putin stated that ‘the nationalists’ coup in the 
Ukrainian capital of Kiev in February 2014 has hugely scared 
2.5 million Russian people living on Crimea. […] Our soldiers 
have merely prevented the Ukrainian troops on Crimea from 
impeding the freedom of expression of the people’ (Bild, 2016). 
The understanding of the German context – in this case of the 
German insistence on the need to respect norms – have made 
Putin’s narrative particularly appealing to this context. 
To reinforce the narrative that places blame for the crisis in 
Ukraine on the West, Putin also treated the war in Ukraine as 
just a symptom of the crisis of faith in the global order; an 
order with the European security architecture at its core. In Pu-
tin’s words, ‘[…] 25 years ago, the Berlin Wall fell, but invisible 
walls were moved to the East of Europe. This has led to mutual 
misunderstanding and assignments of guilt…’. This reading is 
coupled with an accusation of the West, which could also have 
‘abstained from an expansion to the east’ (Bild, 2016). By wid-
ening the discussion nets to include the past, Russian narra-
tives zoom out of the ongoing details of the war in Ukraine and 
divert the debate to other issues. 
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Russia is depicted as not being a party to the conflict in 
Ukraine, but as a diplomatic mediator alongside Germany 
and France. Accordingly, Putin and Merkel both pursue the 
common objective of promoting a ceasefire in Ukraine while 
stressing the importance of respecting the Minsk agreement 
(SF, 2016a). The consistent theme is that Russia wants to have 
good relations with the US and the EU based on an equal foot-
ing. Hence, according to Dmitri Medvedev, those responsible 
for destabilising relations (notably the EU and the US) should 
be held responsible for mending them (RT, 2016d). Thus, the 
common narrative that is reinforced is that the ‘ball is in the 
West’s court’ (SF, 2016f). 
Not only is Russia portrayed as ready to improve relations, but 
also as a necessary partner for the West to tackle its prob-
lems. While NATO is depicted as hostile, Russia is portrayed 
as ready to share information and collaborate with the West 
(RT, 2016d). Numerous articles stress that Russia is a West-
ern strategic partner sharing realpolitik objectives. Ukraine is 
listed as one of these objectives, alongside the fight against 
terrorism, settlement in Syria, the nuclear deal in Iran and cli-
mate change (see for instance, RBTH, 2016b). The realpolitik 
approach includes the bundling together of several issues and 
making an argument that progress on some issues  (e.g. Syria) 
implores the West to make other concessions, for instance on 
Ukraine. 
The sanctions are portrayed not just as ineffective, but as 
positive for Russia’s economic development (RT, 2016d). For 
instance, it is argued that the economy became ‘healthier’ and 
less dependent on the West since sanctions took hold (ibid.). 
In turn, Russian-sponsored media portray the impact on the 
West as dire. Thus, the dominant narrative is that lifting sanc-
tions is in the interest of EU politicians (RT, 2016k; RT, 2016l).
Moreover, sanctions are regarded as part of the US’ ‘hidden 
agenda to weaken Russia’ (SF, 2016d) on the grounds that 
different actors within the US would financially benefit from 
‘fighting Russian aggression’ (SF, 2016d; SF 2016e). Although 
such thoughts contradict the narrative that Russia is inter-
ested in cooperation with the US, the victimisation and anti-
American theme resonates with Russian-sponsored news in 
both Germany and France. The narrative also resonates with 
far-right and far-left anti-establishment and anti-Western dis-
courses, in both Germany and France.
Narratives in the German and French press
The German and French news coverage of the Minsk II agree-
ment, as well as the role of Russia and Ukraine in its imple-
mentation, differs sharply from the Russian-sponsored news. 
Russia is depicted not as a mediator, but as a party to the con-
flict that has ‘hidden agendas’ in Ukraine (Le Monde, 2015a). 
Accordingly, Russia is depicted as trying to put the blame on 
Ukraine in order to cover its own responsibility in sponsoring 
the separatists. This narrative also describes Russia’s strat-
egy as keeping ‘the situation tense in Ukraine’ in order to dis-
tract the people from the needed reforms (ibid.). Hence, some 
French experts suggest to the press that ‘the status quo’ in 
Ukraine ‘is in the interest of Russia’ (RFI, 2016b).
However, both French and German media provides a diversity 
of arguments, including arguments sympathetic to the Rus-
sian position. For instance, it was reported that considering 
the progress with Minsk II, both the US Secretary of State, 
John Kerry, and the French Minister of the Economy, Emma-
nuel Macron, seemed to agree on the lifting of sanctions on 
Russia (Le Monde, 2016a). 
These newspapers tend to draw on a variety of sources, rang-
ing from Russian to Ukrainian ones. Hence, other stories in-
cluded arguments that ‘Moscow does not respect Minsk’ (Le 
Figaro, 2016a). The articles stressed that both the French 
President, Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, argued for the need to respect the Minsk II agreement 
and made the lifting of sanctions as dependent upon its imple-
mentation (Le Vif, 2016).
In the German news coverage, the press at times blames the 
separatists without always stressing the Russian support they 
receive. However, some articles placed the blame for the fail-
ure of Minsk II on Russia (Die Welt, 2015). German domestic 
coverage also includes the discussion of Ukraine’s struggles 
to realise the reforms and at times link them to the Minsk II 
agreement (Die Welt, 2016a). Unlike Russian coverage, the 
German press stressed that the foreign ministers call on (and 
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not blame) Ukraine to do more to implement the agreement in 
order to avoid further Russian aggression (Die Zeit, 2016a).
The analysis of public opinion, as well as the wider context of 
political relations between these countries, further illuminates a 
sharper divide in the attitudes towards Russia in Germany and 
France. 
Public opinion in Germany and France regarding 
Ukraine and Russia
While the Russian narrative resonates with certain segments 
of the German and French population, public opinion is divid-
ed in both countries. The majority of respondents to a recent 
Pew Survey still place the blame for the Ukraine crisis on Rus-
sia and/or Russia-supported separatists (2015 Pew Research 
Center Survey). Accordingly, when asked ‘who is to blame for 
the violence in eastern Ukraine’, in Germany 54% blamed ‘pro-
Russian separatists in Ukraine’ and Russia (25% and 29%, re-
spectively); and only 9% answered that the Ukrainian govern-
ment is responsible (12% Western countries and 17% answered 
that they did not know). In France, the same question received 
the following results: 74% blamed ‘pro-Russian separatists’ and 
Russia (30% and 44%, respectively), 14% blamed the Ukrainian 
government, and 9% blamed Western countries, with a 2% an-
swering ‘don’t know’. 
Both, Germany and France, have witnessed some of the strong-
est growth in negative perceptions of Russia in 2014:  79% in 
Germany and 73% in France (see Missiroli et al., 2016). Accord-
ing to the 2014 Pew Research Center, when asked the question 
‘how much confidence do you have in Russian President Putin 
to do the right thing regarding world affairs?’ in France, 85% of 
respondents and 77% in Germany answered to have ‘no confi-
dence’ (respectively against a mere 16% and 22% who answered 
positively). 
The influence of Russian narratives on the critical minority of 
respondents should however not be underestimated. Narratives 
that promote beliefs in a ‘decadent West’, anti-refugee senti-
ments, a gloomy outlook on the economy, belief in conspiracy 
theories and lack of faith in political leaders and the transatlan-
tic alliance, have a consistent audience and can be crucial in 
the election debates in Germany and France, as well as other 
EU Member States. However, considering the resources that 
Russia devotes to promoting its narratives abroad, what helps 
explain the fairly negative public opinion of its policies?
The role of the ‘Ukraine crisis’ in Russian relations with 
Germany and France
The war in Ukraine and the sequencing of the Minsk agreement 
can be overall regarded as the main drivers of change in Germa-
ny’s and France’s relationship with Russia. But has the‘Ukraine 
crisis’ been the main turning point in these relations?
While both Germany and France are considered to be support-
ers of Russian engagement in the European security architec-
ture, their relationship with Russia had begun to deteriorate well 
before the Ukrainian crisis erupted. For instance, a report writ-
ten by members of the French Senate ‘Foreign Affairs, Defence, 
and Armed Forces Committee’, which assesses the evolution 
of France-Russia and EU-Russia relations since the end of the 
Cold War, argues that deteriorating relations depends on differ-
ent reasons, ‘including missed opportunities for cooperation 
and diverging foreign policy visions.’ (Del Picchia et al., 2015). 
Other authors underlined that the Ukrainian crisis has been a 
‘watershed’ moment that has worsened a deteriorating climate 
triggered by Russia’s scanty democracy and human rights re-
cord (Mendras, 2013; Litra et al., 2016). 
A similar narrative is echoed in Germany. As Forsberg concludes, 
‘Merkel’s attitude towards Moscow has already soured in Sep-
tember of the previous year when Putin announced that he and 
Medvedev were going to swap jobs and he intended to make a 
renewed bid for the presidency’ (2016: 26). Human rights and 
democratic reasons – including the imprisonment of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and the members of the Pussy Riot band – have 
contributed to this change. The 2012 Bundestag resolution un-
derlined the authoritarian turn triggered by President Vladimir 
Putin’s return to office and expressed concerns on measures 
which combine ‘increasing control over active citizens, criminal-
izing critical engagement and creating a confrontation course 
against government critics’ (quoted in Forsberg, 2016: 26).
At the same time, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has facilitated 
an important debate within these countries’ societies. Accord-
ing to the April 2014 Allensbach Institute survey, over 50% of 
Germans ‘considered Russia as a threat to Germany’ (Siddi, 
52016: 669). Before the Ukraine crisis, only one third of respond-
ents considered Russia as a threat. Russian actions in Syria 
have also contributed to its negative perception. While there 
have been divergent views on Russia among the ‘tougher’ Chris-
tian Democrats and the ‘softer’ Social Democrats, most of them 
continue to support a critical stance on Russia with regard to its 
advances in Ukraine. 
The Russian emphasis on having spheres of influence does not 
resonate with many ruling elites in both Germany and France. 
For instance, even though Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Stein-
meier has promoted lifting sanctions and had a ‘softer’ line to-
wards Russia, his own stance has been fairly critical of Russia’s 
‘limited sovereignty politics’ towards its neighbours. In his De-
cember 2014 speech in Yekaterinburg (Russia), he argued, ‘… In 
the 18th century, German and Russian rulers divided the terri-
tory of Poland amongst themselves three times, until there was 
nothing left of Poland. […] We must also be aware of how these 
historical experiences still cause our neighbours to worry today’ 
(quoted in Getmanchuk and Solodkyy, 2016: 11).
At the same time, negative views on Russia do not translate 
into a positive image for Ukraine. In fact, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, both Germany and France viewed Ukraine as 
well as other post-Soviet non-EU countries through its ‘Russia 
first’ policy (see Getmanchuk and Solodkyy, 2016; Litra et al., 
2016). While the war has heighted the attention on Ukraine, the 
image of corruption and nepotism among the Ukrainian elites 
dominate the perception. Russian narratives only reinforce this 
perception. Thus there is no ‘black and white’ vision in France 
and Germany, proving that the narratives that both Russia and 
Ukraine project only partially influence the domestic context of 
Germany and France. 
The calls for cooperation with Russia do not seem to imply a 
return to relations of trust, but rather the need for damage con-
trol – at least from the points of view of the German and French 
elites. According to such reasoning, having Russia as part of the 
dialogue is one way to try to avoid further escalation of tensions. 
Public opinion, including Germany’s preoccupation with refugee 
policy and French worries about terrorism, adds another layer of 
complexity to the unified EU policy towards Russia. The extent 
to which the realpolitik approach sets its tone in Germany and 
France is yet to be seen.
Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates that although Russian narratives 
are reported in the French and German press, they overall do 
not dominate the discussion. Russian sources are quoted 
alongside experts and Ukrainian sources. While this research 
included only a limited ‘snapshot’ of articles in the German and 
French press, focusing primarily on the timing of the one-year 
anniversary of the Minsk II agreement, more thorough research 
could reveal greater divides in the coverage. While noting that 
the French media has been sympathetic to Ukraine (in particu-
lar ‘Le Monde, Libération or La Croix), some authors (Litra et al. 
2016) also noted that ‘… the right-wing newspaper Le Figaro is 
more critical and regularly leaning towards pro-Kremlin views, 
as such right-wing weekly magazines L’Express or Le Poin’. A 
similar situation is likely to apply to Germany. 
Regardless of the worrying internal divisions within Germany 
and France, the Ukraine crisis has reinforced important ties be-
tween Germany and France. Both countries have experienced 
divergent priorities, including refugees for one and the terrorist 
threat for the other (Techau, 2016). Despite this, the leaders of 
both countries have managed to keep ‘a critical mass within the 
EU in favour of the unified policy’ (Speck, 2016). Nevertheless, 
the future position of Germany and France should not be taken 
for granted. While there is a high percentage of those (including 
the general population and the elites) who are willing to pursue 
the Minsk implementation, including its security component, 
internal challenges may fuel a softer stance on Russia. While 
democratic institutions, including a vibrant media space, allow 
for greater debate and critical reading of the Russian-sponsored 
narrative, democratic resilience may be weakened by greater in-
ternal concerns. The support for initiatives that promote media 
literacy and grant support to independent journalists can be 
seen as ways to address these challenges. 
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Footnotes
1 The Minsk II agreement was concluded on 12 February 2015, building on 
the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014. Minsk II includes a package 
of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, which is 
available at: http://www.osce.org/cio/140156
2 This gap in interpretation was analyzed in a previous IES Policy brief: 
http://www.ies.be/policy-brief/mind-gap-interpreting-minsk-ii-agree-
ment.
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